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ABSTRACT 
Cotton is the largest source of export receipts of several West African countries. Statistics however show 
a decreasing tendency in cotton yields and an increasing tendency in pesticide use. Under this 
circumstances there appear to be potential payoffs from the use of biotechnology products in the farming 
systems of the region. In this study we estimate different scenarios for the potential deployment of insect 
resistant cotton in selected countries in West Africa (WA).  
  We use an economic surplus model augmented with a more rigorous sensitivity analysis of model 
parameters. Hypothetical scenarios of Bt cotton adoption in WA are simulated and single point values of 
model parameters are substituted with probability distributions. The scenarios include: no adoption in 
WA; adoption of existing varieties; adoption of WA varieties backcrossed with private sector lines; and 
fluctuating adoption patterns. 
  According to the simulations, the total net benefits of adopting Bt seem to be small even after 
including the innovator surplus who accrues a larger share of the benefits. In contrast the WA countries 
included in the evaluation are worse off if they decide no to adopt Bt cotton. These results are in part 
explained by the conservative assumptions taken. The adoption pattern and the length of the adoption 
period affect the share of benefits earned by producers as compared to innovators. This study provides 
tools and information that can be used to build greater confidence in the process of setting agricultural 
research investment priorities. 
Key Words:  Bt cotton, West Africa, economic surplus, risk, probability distributions, impact 
assessment, net benefits 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Governments and producers in West Africa have expressed interest in the potential application of modern 
biotechnology products as one way to improve the economic and social returns to smallholder agriculture 
and to increase food security in the region. Potential applications of modern biotechnology innovations 
include improved crop resistance to pests, diseases, weeds and abiotic stresses, all of which could 
positively affect the rural poor in West Africa. The development of appropriate and sustainable 
bioinnovations in West Africa however needs to recognize the wide variability in bio-physical conditions, 
prevailing production systems, governance and institutional issues, as well as the different degrees to 
which each commodity will be affected by different production constraints.  
Genetically modified insect resistant (Bt) cotton is currently considered for use in West Africa 
(see Appendix A for a description of the technology). This bioinnovation that was developed by the 
private sector has already been field tested in Burkina Faso. The potential adoption of Bt cotton in West 
Africa has generated significant controversies related to the potential socio-economic, institutional, 
political and environmental effects of technology adoption. Socio-economic concerns about the potential 
market effects of local adoption of Bt cotton include impacts on resource poor farmers, farmers 
dependence on a continuous flow of innovations, as well as external impacts that may affect local farmers 
such as the potentially adverse reaction in some European markets.  Other important concerns raised by 
opponents of the technology are the potential environmental and ecological implications of transgenic 
technologies, all of which bring additional uncertainty to the likelihood of farmer adoption.  
Despite these challenges and uncertainties, there does appear to be a significant potential for 
capturing large economic, social, and environmental payoffs from the use of biotechnology products in 
the farming systems of Africa (Cabanilla et al. 2004; Elbehri and MacDonald 2004). The potential 
payoffs must be weighed against the potential costs and risks to both society and the environment. Results 
presented here are an attempt to use best practices and methodologies to assess the potential impact of the 
adoption of insect resistant cotton in West Africa.  
The primary purpose of this analysis was to illustrate the application of an augmented economic 
surplus model to estimate the potential impact of Bt cotton adoption in west Africa. The present scope of 
this study is not to generate definitive estimates of the level and social distribution of benefits, as this 
would require extensive field data collection. Nevertheless, we have used the best available information 
on constraints and productivity alleviation potential to showcase patterns of variables potentially affecting 
Bt cotton performance. Examination of these patterns lends insights into critical issues for designing 
biotechnology, advancing biosafety regulatory processes and making policy decisions.    2
For instance, we could illustrate the effects on economic benefits of changes in technology fees or 
regulatory delays that result from additional years of testing. Flexibility has been built into the design of 
the model so that modifications are easy to implement. Given the brief time period of this study, it was 
not feasible to work with national experts from the study countries in order to calibrate the model and 
validate the results. However, the results of this study, the methodological approach and the stochastic 
economic surplus simulation tools will be made accessible to our West African colleagues. Planned joint 
activities in the near future include collecting detailed field data.  
The study is structured as follows. First, we briefly review the current context and issues 
surrounding cotton production, productivity constraints and biotechnology development and use in the 
West Africa region. Next we describe the methodological steps of the economic surplus assessment, 
augmented to take into account risk considerations. We then estimate the potential magnitude of the 
economic cost, benefits and risk from Bt cotton in West Africa, and indicate how these are likely to be 
distributed among innovators, farmers, and consumers within adopting nations in the West Africa region. 
This study provides tools and information that can be used by policy analysts, policy makers, those 
funding biotechnology, national research directors, and other stakeholders to build greater confidence in 
the process of setting investment priorities. There is a pressing need though to collect and assess field data 
on pests, control efforts, adoption behaviors, and other relevant parameters from individual countries, 
regions and producers in order to fine tune the estimates presented here.  
Cotton in West Africa  
Cotton production and productivity in West Africa 
Cotton plays an important part in West Africa’s development, particularly through regional exports to 
world markets and as a source of hard currency. Cotton is relatively well suited for the agro-ecological 
conditions in West Africa and other areas where drought and rainfall variability limits planting alternative 
crops. Cotton represents the largest source of export receipts for several West and Central African 
countries. Africa accounts for approximately 10-15 percent of world cotton exports (Baffes 2004; 
UNCTAD 2006). Although Africa’s total share of world trade in cotton is relatively small, the crop is 
critical to the economies of numerous countries on the continent. Table 1 disaggregates the value of 
production and shares of exports by country for all of the cotton producing countries in the region.  
Eight countries in West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, 
Senegal and Togo) produce 99 percent of all cotton in the region. According to Baffes (2004) and 
UNCTAD (2006), all countries in West Africa cultivate a total of 2.9 million hectares. Areas have 
increased dramatically over the last 20-30 years in the region (Ton 2001; SWAC Secretariat/OECD 
2005). Comparative advantage of the region in terms of lower production costs, the high quality of fiber,   3
and existing institutional infrastructure that supports farmers accounted for these dramatic increases. In 
addition, all countries in West Africa export approximately 745 million dollars worth of cotton annually 
(a total regional production of 2.8 million tons of cotton lint per year). Mali, Côte d'Ivoire and Benin are 
the three largest exporters. The share of cotton in the total exports of Burkina Faso and Benin is above 35 
percent.  Furthermore, in Burkina Faso, Benin, Mali and Chad, the share of total agricultural exports is 
higher than 50 percent.  
According to SWAC Secretariat / OECD (2005) a significant share of cotton is planted by 
smallholder farmers. This paper estimates that 1-2 million smallholder farmers produce the crop, largely 
with household labor. In addition, production on household farms engages an estimated 6 million persons 
directly and an estimated 16 million persons off-farm in the cotton industry. Cotton production is carried 
out in diversified farming systems that include crops such as cereals and vegetables. This mode of 
production serves the dual purpose of providing for household consumption and cash needs. 
Cotton in West Africa tends to have significantly lower production costs compared to 
industrialized countries (SWAC Secretariat / OECD 2005; Estur 2005). This is the result of lower labor 
costs and the significantly lower use of productive inputs such as fertilizer and pesticides by West African 
farmers. Because cotton is hand picked, the quality also tends to be higher than in other countries. The 
level of contamination from foreign matter though has increased in hand picked cotton. This factor added 
to the stickiness induced by pest infestations has translated to penalties and in some cases refusals to buy 
the production (SWAC Secretariat /OECD 2005).   
Cotton production in West Africa has been characterized by its vertically integrated production 
system (the Filière intégrée) from farm to gin.  The system in most countries is still controlled –with some 
variations– by the State. In most countries the State continues to regulate and intervene in market 
operations, yet most governments are at the same time divesting themselves from the cotton sector. The 
lack of sustainability of a state support system and the pressure to liberalize important economic sectors 
has been main driving forces for African governments to take a sidestep on the cotton production and 
marketing chain. Monopsonistic structures however continue to exist in Cameroon, Chad, Mali, and 
Senegal, as there are approximately 25 ginning companies with 84 gins in the eight largest producing 
countries (Estur 2005) thus allowing exercise of market power.  In contrast, ginning has been liberalized 
(partially or completely) in Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Togo. The SWAC Secretariat / 
OECD, (2005) same reference cited before indicate that most of cotton producers in the region belong to 
more than 1,000 producer associations or cooperatives.    4
2.  PRODUCTIVITY CONSTRAINTS OF COTTON IN WEST AFRICA 
Insects and Diseases 
Lepidopteran insects cost West African producers approximately 194 million dollars in insecticides 
annually (CAB International 2001). Table 2 lists the Lepidopteran insects reported as significant enough 
to require pesticide controls in West Africa. In the region yield losses due to these insects, with 
insecticidal control reach on average 23 and 34 percent without control.  
Ajayi et al. (2002) have indicated that in recent years cotton yields have declined in West Africa 
with a concurrent increase in the use of pesticides. This pattern may be partially explained by increased 
resistance of pests to commonly used pesticides in the region. For example, Martin et al. (2002) reported 
resistance of cotton bollworm to pesticides. There have been some efforts to change the current system 
for managing insect pests in order to reduce costs and improve control by farmers (Ochourt et al. 1998). 
Use of control thresholds early in the season is one of these strategies, but as of 2001 this practice does 
not appear to have been widely adopted (Silvie et al. 2001). 
Other productivity constraints on Cotton in West Africa   
Apart from pests and diseases there are other biotic and abiotic constraints to cotton producers’ 
productivity in West Africa. These include: 
•  Severe decreases of annual precipitation amounts coupled with an increase in rainfall variability, 
especially in the Sahelian countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad, and Senegal (Toulmin and 
Gueyè 2003). Although cotton resists drought to a higher degree than other crops, the decreases 
in annual precipitation are sufficient to affect cotton productivity. 
•  Severe decreases in soil fertility and severe increases in land degradation. These two factors have 
reduced soil productivity in the region.  
•  Poverty issues. On one hand, a study on poverty in Burkina Faso shows that poverty has 
decreased amongst the rural poor and amongst cotton producers from 1998 to 2003 (World Bank 
2004a). On the other hand, cotton producers have become more vulnerable to risk as the terms of 
trade of cotton have been severely affected by low international prices (World Bank 2004b).   
•  Internal, regional and external macro policies that have an impact on agriculture. These policies 
include exchange rates, structural adjustments, liberalizations, and subsidies to cotton production 
in industrialized countries.  
The introduction of the Bt cotton in West Africa will be greatly enhanced if it is part of a broader 
technological package that addresses other constraints listed above. Bt cotton is a knowledge intensive 
technology and addressing potential for institutional and environmental problems as early as possible in   5
the technology diffusion process would help to ensure benefits. As we know the possibilities for 
alternative crop substitutions and cropping rotations are limited in the region. Thus, enhancing cotton 
production continues to be a necessary strategy for West African policy makers and national agricultural 
research systems, and now with an increasingly larger role- the private sector.   6
3.  STAKEHOLDERS AND THE DEBATE WITH REGARD TO BT COTTON 
Independently of the controversy generated and uncertainties of GM technologies, area planted to Bt 
cotton has increased significantly over the last years. Estimated adoption rates of Bt and other GM cotton 
have reached 50 percent in Mexico, 70 percent in China and 95 percent in South Africa (Appendix A). 
Area planted to cotton has doubled in India, and the expectation is that the share of GM cotton will 
increase significantly as the Government of India has introduced mandates reducing the price charged to 
farmers to almost half of the previous year’s values. Price charged to farmers including the technology fee 
is one of the themes identified by Smale et al. (2006) as one of the cross-cutting issues defining the level 
of producer benefits across countries.  
The technology might be very successful at controlling Lepidopteran insects, but it is the 
institutional and/or marketing conditions that may in the end determine whether farmers gain or lose from 
introduction of the technology (Smale et al. 2006). Another critical issue is the ability of the innovator 
and/or the technology transfer agent to transmit to farmers the necessary knowledge to manage the 
technology under field conditions. Furthermore, the need arises to re-think the Bt technology and other 
insect resistance technologies as part of a broad, integrated pest management or better yet, an integrated 
crop management strategy for implementation in West Africa. We argue then that the introduction of Bt 
cotton needs to be made considering the broader agricultural development and economic growth policies 
where proper incentives support the sustainability of the technology and of technology flows over time.  
The potential production of Bt cotton in West Africa has been a very controversial issue over the 
last years. The debate in West Africa has been magnified by conflicting positions for and against taken by 
some civil society organizations, non-governmental actors, producer organizations and the private sector 
(including multi-national companies).  Some NGOs and producer organizations have campaigned (and 
continue to do so) against the introduction of Bt cotton and other GM biotechnologies.
2  
Stakeholders opposing the introduction of Bt cotton and other technologies argue that genetic 
modifications will reduce biodiversity, harm ecosystems in West Africa, negatively affect organic and 
Fair Trade cotton production systems, and create even more dependency of farmers on productive inputs. 
In contrast, proponents of Bt cotton argue that it presents economic advantages, reduces dependence on 
international companies involved in the distribution of pesticide and fertilizer, and has a safe track record 
under field conditions in several countries. The safety recored has been validated by the accumulated 
                                                 
2 Examples of the opposition to the introduction of Bt cotton arguments are contained in the publications by the Association 
des Organisations Paysannes Professionnelles in Mali (AOPP) “Manifeste: le Mali face à la menace des O.G.M.”  or the 
publication “GM cotton set to invade West Africa Time to act!” edited by GRAIN, OBEPAB: Organisation Béninoise pour la 
Promotion (Benin), REDAD: Réseau pour le Développement Durable (Benin), GIPD: Projet de Gestion Intégrée de la Production 
et des Déprédateurs (Mali) and the PAN Afrique: Pesticides Action Network (Senegal).   7
experience with previous use of Bt as a foliar insecticide, the environmental and food safety assessments 
in other countries, and the safe track record of the event used extensively under filed conditions. This 
technology has been approved for release into the environment by biosafety regulatory systems in 
countries such as South Africa, Argentina, Mexico, China, USA, Australia, India and others without any 
major negative biosafety outcomes to date.  
The introduction of Bt cotton in West Africa will follow formal biosafety assessments and 
approval by biosafety regulatory agencies in individual country. West Africa has moved to advance 
regional efforts towards establishing a coherent biosafety and regulatory framework for biotechnology. 
However, these efforts have not materialized just yet in the region. In spite of these regional efforts for 
biosafety regulation, regulatory approval will be given by national governments (as the valid legal 
competent entity for effects of the Cartagena Protocol and Convention of Biological diversity) unless 
regional approaches for approval are negotiated within the region.   
Other stakeholders involved with the decision making process include West African 
Governments, public sector institutions, the French government and public sector. The Ministries of 
Agriculture, Science and Technology, Trade and Finance, and Environment in West African countries 
may have different decision making approaches to these technologies as their mission, objectives and 
time frames, are typically different. In some cases, regulatory approaches supported by a specific ministry 
may be more precautionary, whereas in others technology development and deployment may be vital for 
some other ministries and public sector organizations. 
From the standpoint of the private sector, West Africa may be an attractive market. Table 3 
presents gross income estimates of the value of the technology fee under varying adoption assumptions.   
Assuming a constant 20 percent adoption rate across all countries in the region, the total market value of 
the Bt technology fee runs from 8.5 to 45 million dollars for fees of $15 and $80 per hectare, respectively. 
If the area planted to Bt cotton reaches 20 percent in the countries with the highest potential to adopt Bt 
cotton in the region including Burkina Faso, Benin, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo; the total value of the 
technology fee ranges from 4.6 to 24.5 million dollars annually for these countries. In general, private 
sector innovators including Monsanto/Delta and Pineland and Syngenta will support bio-innovations 
within the scope of a business model, whereas NGOs and other Civil Society organizations may oppose 
the introduction of this technology. One cannot generalize as different.    8
4.  REVIEW OF RESEARCH METHODS  
Experiences with Bt Cotton  
Bt cotton impact evaluation at the industry level have been more documented in industrialized countries, 
namely the U.S. Falck-Zepeda et al. (2000a, 2000b) analyzed the case of Bt cotton in the U.S. from 1996-
1999 using Alston, Norton and Pardey (1999) approach to economic surplus and Moschini and Lapan 
(1997) framework to account for temporary monopolies derived from intellectual property. The Falck-
Zepeda articles laid out a model that has since provided the foundation for economic surplus applications 
for the assessment of biotechnologies in developing economies.
3 This model has also served in further 
analysis of various crops biotechnologies in U.S. agriculture (e.g., Lin, et al. 2004).
4  
Ex-post impact evaluations have been conducted at the farm level in China, South Africa, India, 
Argentina and Mexico However, there is very limited literature that covers the ex-post impact at national 
(aggregated) level, of Bt cotton in non-industrialized countries For a complete discussion of the studies in 
these countries please refer to Smale et al. (2006). The number of ex-ante evaluation studies is even 
smaller. The following discussion will center on relevant issues for the study done in West Africa.  
Pray et al. (2001) using a single year of data in China found that smallholder farmers gained 
substantial economic benefits from Bt cotton adoption, Consumers however did not benefit because the 
government bought almost all of the cotton at a fixed price. Moreover, because of weak intellectual 
property rights (IPR), farmers obtained the major share of the benefits, with very little accruing to 
Monsanto or the public research institutions that developed local Bt varieties. (Traxler et al. 2003; Traxler 
and Godoy-Avila 2004) found that Bt cotton reduced costs and raised revenues for farmers in the 
Comarca Lagunera in North-Central Mexico using small open economy model. In this area reduced 
insecticide use benefited producers, consumers and the environment. Over the two years of the study, the 
authors estimated that seed suppliers and innovators earned 15 percent of the economic benefits from 
adoption, while farmers earned the major portion of these benefits (85 percent). Consumers did not 
                                                 
3 The findings of studies conducted in the U.S. are of interest, though they are not fully reported in the text. Falck-Zepeda et 
al. found that, over the 3 years studied, farmers and the innovator-seed supplier (Monsanto-Delta and Pineland) shared almost 
equally in the benefits, despite the temporary monopoly in the seed market. Falck-Zepeda, et al. (2000) explain that the 
monopolist must provide farmers with an adoption incentive by setting a price that makes the new input more profitable than 
existing options—a principle that is well established in the economics literature. Consumers gained very little, which is expected 
to be the case for agronomic traits such as insect-resistance as compared to product quality attributes. Lin, et al. (2004) reported 
that US farmers captured a much larger share of benefits for Bt cotton than for herbicide-tolerant (HT) soybeans and HT cotton. 
In the case of HT cotton, U.S. consumers and the rest of the world (ROW) received the bulk of the benefits.   
4 Particularly in industrialized economies where supplementary databases can be consulted, numerous additions to the basic 
model have been proposed. Examples include adding spatial data on pest and disease incidence (Alston et al. 2002, for rootworm 
resistant maize in the U.S.), and a bio-economic model with stochastic simulation (Demont and Tollens, 2004). A remaining 
subset of this literature includes several articles that recommend and/or apply the real options approach to address the issue of 
irreversibility in costs and benefits of genetically engineered crop varieties.  
   9
receive economic benefits since there was no change in price and the region is assumed to be a price taker 
and thus dependent on the prevailing world price. Traxler et al. (2004) further assert that the risk of crop 
failure declined with the use of the Bt cotton technology in Comarca Lagunera.  
Bt cotton Studies in West Africa  
Few GM impact studies have been conducted in West Africa. These few studies have mostly focused on 
the evaluation of insect resistant cotton. Cabanilla et al. (2004) developed a linear-programming model to 
assess the potential cost to West Africa (in particular, Mali) of not adopting Bt cotton. The aggregate 
benefits per year to farmers were estimated at $68 million in Mali, $41 million in Burkina Faso, $53 
million in Benin, $39 million in Côte d' Ivoire and $8 million in Senegal. The authors drew parameters 
from detailed farm-level studies already conducted in Mali, and combined these with published data from 
studies implemented in China, South Africa and Mexico.  On their representative farm, they included 
groundnut and cereals cultivation to meet subsistence needs. The analysis was used to generate estimates 
of optimal land area allocations, output, farm profit, and whole farm income. They then aggregated their 
findings to the national level and conducted sensitivity analyses, introducing the effects of various 
technology fees. Their results indicate that even with a high technology fee, there are significant 
economic benefits that would be lost without the adoption of Bt cotton, including more stable farm 
incomes. Cabanilla et al. (2004) point to important institutional issues, such as whether the technology 
will be imported, adapted, or generally adopted, as likely to be significant determinants of the extent and 
social distribution of benefits.  
Overall results presented in studies evaluating Bt cotton show the possibility of producer 
receiving net benefits caused by the use of Bt cotton. Economic surplus and other measurements of 
economic performance estimated in the literature evaluating Bt cotton vary over time, size and scale of 
production systems and location. Results of studies presented depend on pest population dynamics, crop 
management practices, availability of appropriate information to manage the crop, seed costs including 
the technology fee, and farmer and farm production attributes. In this sense, findings from one country or 
location are very hard to generalize.  
Another important observation is that significant economic and environmental impacts have not 
been included in the studies done so far. Issues that include the positive or negative effects of reducing 
pesticide applications to the environment, loss of agricultural and wildlife biodiversity, potential effects 
on non-target organisms or changes in risk and vulnerability, have not been considered in most studies of 
Bt and other biotechnologies adoption.    10
Limitations and Opportunities of the Economic Surplus Approach 
The assumptions used to derive standard applications of the economic surplus models, as well as their 
limitations, are well known (see Appendix B). Economic surplus models best depict an industry with 
commercially-oriented farmers who buy and sell in well-organized markets and who grow their crops 
under relatively homogeneous growing conditions. The economic surplus model nonetheless can be used 
judiciously in a developing country setting given that its limitations are fully understood. In particular it is 
important to understand that the quality of the underlying data is crucial to the validity of the results. In 
general, reliable cross-sectional time-series data are not yet available for these technologies in developing 
economies because they are too costly to collect. In contrast, in the U.S., extensive surveys have been 
conducted continually (e.g., the USDA Agriculture Resource Management Survey on which many of the 
detailed analyses are based), and cheaper methods are feasible (mail and phone interviews). 
“Pure” ex ante analyses (in the sense that they have no data drawn directly from field 
observations) are even more limited than ex post analyses. In the case of these analyses, all parameters are 
projected based on expert interviews and existing secondary data. On the other hand, if carefully crafted 
and interpreted, ex ante analyses of this type can still provide information that is crucial for national 
decision-makers in a relative small period of time.  
Economic surplus models are used to estimate aggregated outcomes for all producers in the unit 
of analysis. Although it is feasible to disaggregate producers by size, the economic surplus model is not 
intended for modeling individual farmer and/or household effects. Two points should be emphasized. 
First, adaptations to standard models via explicit modifications of the structural equations within the 
model are feasible to treat some of the methodological challenges described above. To construct the 
modified economic surplus systems of equations such as the ones derived in Appendix B for adaptation to 
local conditions, one needs to have a clear understanding of the internal organizational structure within 
the country. Secondly, this methodology provides the type of information that most national policy 
makers and investors in technology development consider to be fundamental to the decision-making 
process. 
In order to obtain a significantly better diagnostic of the potential impact from the introduction of 
Bt cotton in West Africa and elsewhere, several complementary methodologies will need to be 
implemented in tandem or sequentially through a well thought-out triangulation of approaches and multi-
disciplinary processes (Meinzen-Dick, et al. 2004) at farmer, household, industry and trade levels.   11
5.  MODEL SPECIFICATION 
We use an economic surplus model
5 augmented with a more rigorous sensitivity analysis of model 
parameters (Davis and Espinoza 1998; Falck-Zepeda et al. 2000; Zhao et al. 2000; Fisher et al. 2001). The 
economic surplus model consists of a set of equations that depict the cotton market in an economy. Based 
on the available data, a set of distributions are posited for the parameters subject to uncertainty, sparse 
data, or even discrepancies between experts with regard to magnitude or direction of effect. This approach 
to the economic surplus model addresses some of the data limitations mentioned above. 
We used an add-in program for spreadsheets (@Risk™ software). This software allows for the 
substitution of single point values of model parameters with a probability distribution. The probability 
distribution may be created entirely by imposing the parameters of a particular distribution (such as the 
mean and standard deviation for the normal distribution). Alternatively, the @Risk
TM program can be 
used to fit distributions to existing field data. This approach opens the possibility of performing advanced 
analysis of the risk associated with variation in: supply elasticities, adoption rates, technology transfer 
fees, per hectare cotton yields, and costs of production.  
For this study, we generated sample values by drawing from a triangular distribution of each 
parameter using the @Risk
TM program. The triangular distribution is a continuous probability distribution, 
described by the minimum, maximum, and mode (or “most likely”) parameter values. The triangular 
distribution is the simplest approximation of a normal distribution that is often used in simulations to 
model potential outcomes with sparse sample data. The @Risk
TM program then proceeds to calculate 
model results for designated output variables (e.g., producer surplus, consumer surplus, total surplus, net 
present value, internal rate of return). This step is called an “iteration.” After each iteration, the program 
saves estimated values for each variable and statistics for the iteration. For example, after 10,000 
iterations the program would save 10,000 values for each variable, accompanied by statistics such as 
means, variance, standard deviations, skewness and kurtosis.  Convergence of parameter means to a stable 
state can also be monitored. Convergence to a stable state implies that additional iterations do not 
markedly change the shape of the sampled distribution. We chose a cut-off point of less than 1.5 percent 
change between iterations.   
We applied this process for 5 scenarios: 1) No adoption of Bt cotton in West Africa (WA), but 
adoption in rest of the world; 2) WA adopts available private sector Bt cotton varieties; 3) WA uses West 
African varieties backcrossed with private sector lines; 4) WA uses West African varieties backcrossed 
with private sector lines, premium is negotiated; 5) WA uses West African varieties backcrossed with 
                                                 
5 Appendix B describes how standard models are derived   12
private sector lines but adoption is irregular (For complete discussion of scenarios including assumptions 
see Tables 4a and 4b
6). The number of iterations was set to 10,000 for Scenarios 1 - 4 and 25,000 for 
Scenario 5.  
Producer, consumer, innovator and total surplus were estimated on a yearly basis for a total of 24-
25 years depending on the scenario. The innovator surplus was defined as the additional benefit 
appropriated by the institution that delivered the gene and germplasm. We follow the convention of 
estimating innovator surplus by multiplying the area planted to Bt cotton times the technology fee or 
premium (Falck-Zepeda et al. 2000). This assumption considers the price of conventional seed as 
competitive. Thus, the difference between conventional and Bt cotton seed (defined as the technology fee 
or premium) is the monopoly rent generated by the innovation.
7 Based on the stream of yearly estimates, 
we calculated the Net Present Value (NPV) and when appropriate, the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) to 
society. 
Assumptions 
Our evaluation is based on a number of assumptions mostly based on the available literature on Bt cotton 
experiences in other countries. In this subsection we explain the assumptions and outline the variations 
considered in each of the five scenarios (Table 4a and 4b).  
Adoption Curve  
A critical parameter for simulating an adoption curve is the maximum level of adoption or adoption rate 
for the technology. Cabanilla et al. (2004) assume maximum Bt cotton adoption rates of 30, 50 and 100 
percent in West Africa. In the paper, the authors indicate that due to the severity of the Lepidopteran 
problem (e.g., Mali); it is feasible that some countries could have adoption rates as high as 100 percent. 
These authors’ estimates are based on adoption patterns in China, South Africa, USA and Australia, as 
reported by James (2001, 2002).  For the purposes of this paper, we choose a constant 20 percent adoption 
rate in the rest of the world (ROW), that is, for cotton producers outside West Africa. For Scenarios 2 and 
3 in West Africa, we used 30 percent as the maximum adoption rate in each adopting country (lower 
value used by Cabanilla et al. 2004), In Scenario 4 we allowed a larger adoption rate of 50 percent to 
accommodate a change in adoption induced by a lower Bt seed price. In Scenario 5, we allowed adoption, 
                                                 
6 We estimated 3 additional scenarios including the possibility of Chinese varieties flowing into West Africa 
and other scenarios examining differences in technology fees and institutional diffusion patterns. Results of these 
scenarios will be mentioned briefly in the results section.  
7 Falck Zepeda, Traxler and Nelson (2000a, 2000b) also partitioned innovator surplus between the supplier of 
the gene and the supplier of the seed by examining licenses and royalties that Monsanto and Deltapine paid to each 
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dis-adoption and re-adoption for Mali and Benin. This irregular shaped adoption pattern has been 
documented elsewhere in Africa (Smale et al. 1991; Morris et al. 1999). Scenario 5 is included in order to 
emphasize the importance of institutional and governance considerations. As documented by Gouse et al. 
(2005) for Bt cotton in South Africa, countries may find themselves in the position of having Bt cotton 
becoming a “technological triumph but an institutional failure.”  
Supply elasticity 
The supply elasticity has a critical impact on the level of benefits estimated from an economic surplus 
model. In the conventional economic surplus approach proposed by Alston, Norton and Pardey (1995), 
yield increases (horizontal shifts of the supply curve) are converted to equivalent cost changes (vertical 
shifts of the supply curve) by dividing the percent yield change by the elasticity of supply. Clearly, the 
difference between an elasticity supply of 1 and 0.1 can be dramatic. In the absence of additional 
information, Alston, Norton and Pardey suggest using a unitary elasticity of supply, although this is 
considered to be a weakness of their approach. Other authors have suggested more sophisticated 
approaches (Oehmke and Crawford 2002; Qaim, et al. 2003, Moschini et al. 2000; Demont 2006; Demont 
and Tollens 2004).  The dissertation by Demont (2006) and related peer-reviewed papers has valuable 
discussion on the relative merits and values of these approaches. In his conclusions, Demont (2006) 
suggests that the choice of approach will be dictated by data availability. Given the limited information 
we have about the supply elasticity of cotton in West Africa, we used an assumed unitary elasticity in this 
initial estimation as the most likely value. To set the range of the elasticity values, we consulted Minot 
and Daniels (2005), who employed a lower value of 0.5 and maximum of 1.5, with an intermediate value 
of 1.0. However, we chose a more conservative minimum value (ε =0.3). 
Yield advantage 
The model uses relatively conservative estimates of yield differences between Bt and conventional cotton. 
These values are drawn from published findings (Falck-Zepeda et al. 2000; Huang et al. 2003 and 2004; 
Bennett et al. 2004). The mode (or most likely) value used in our estimations was a 20 percent yield 
difference between Bt and conventional cotton. In turn the maximum value assigned to this variable was 
40 percent and the minimum value was 0 percent. The three values that describe the triangular probability 
distribution represent the range of values in the literature which are based on either experimental results 
(in the case of ex ante studies) and/or actual farmer data (ex-post studies).   
A growing body of literature reminds us that genetic resistance to insects is an input abatement 
technology (Oude Lansink and Carpentier 2001; Pemsl et al. 2005; Qaim and de Janvry 2005). This   14
implies that yield differences between conventional and Bt technologies are observed only when the 
target pest attacks the crop. In seasons when there is no pest infestation, any difference between a Bt 
variety and non-Bt variety would be related to differences in the yield performance of the genotypes 
rather than the trait.  
As a partial solution within the scope of an ex-ante framework to the damage abatement 
consideration in this study we set the minimum value of the yield difference in the triangular distribution 
at zero, allowing for the possibility of no yield effect induced by the Bt trait. Whenever the simulation 
program samples a zero value for yield advantage, it will not have an effect on the displacement 
parameter of the supply curve (“the K”) for that particular simulation. Note that we follow a similar 
rationale for the cost differences parameter below (i.e. introduce possibility of negative yield difference – 
conventional yields more than the Bt variety). It is possible that due to the random sampling procedure 
used in our simulations, a particular iteration may have both yield and cost differences equal to zero, and 
thus yield a negative outcome as farmers still have to pay the technology fee upfront. 
We repeat the calculation of economic surplus for a large number of iterations (10,000-25,000) 
not only to achieve convergence to stable solutions but also to ensure that we obtain a fairly large number 
of iterations from which to draw a distribution of outcomes. The decision maker then needs to analyze 
these results against its risk aversion preferences to make a decision. A much better solution is to have 
data on the frequency of pest infestation, combined with the severity of the infestations in order to model 
specifically the damage abatement process and then continue with the risk simulations, but such data are 
rarely available, particularly at a broad geographical scale. 
Cost advantage  
The cost advantage is the per unit cost savings from reduced pesticide use. In other words the costs 
advantage is the net of the technology premium charged for the use of Bt seed as compared to 
conventional varieties with conventional control. We consulted the literature in order to set the values of 
the triangular distribution (as shown in Table 4b), emphasizing the lower range of values reported. We set 
the minimum cost difference at zero. The implication of this assumption is that in a worst case scenario 
the technology is not successful in controlling target insects and thus does not reduce the need for 
insecticide applications. Alternatively, the Bt technology might be indeed successful in controlling 
primary pests, but secondary pest populations could be high enough that control costs would have to 
increase off-setting benefits from reduced applications to control primary pests. The issues of secondary 
pest infestations that may become economically significant and other environmental impacts are not 
explicitly modeled in our study. These are two areas which we will work on in our work in West Africa.     15
Adaptive research and biosafety regulatory costs:  
The process of drafting and finalizing biosafety regulations and implementation of guidelines is on-going 
in most West African countries. Among both scientists and regulators, there is insufficient clarity 
concerning the steps needed to assess the biosafety profile of GM biotechnologies. This is less so the case 
of Bt cotton in West African countries as there are multiple regional efforts to define appropriate 
biosafety systems in the region
8. Consequently, obtaining accurate estimates for the cost of compliance 
with biosafety regulations for the West African region may not yet be feasible. It is important to point out 
that if such costs of compliance with biosafety regulations were excluded from our simulations, the 
benefit values generated would represent the present value of gross benefits to producers and consumers. 
In this paper we use estimates from other developing countries such as India and China to obtain 
preliminary data on the cost of the biosafety assessments. Since there are very few estimates in the 
literature, we also used estimates reported in conferences and publications for any Bt crop (for example 
Pray et al. 2005, Quemada 2003; Falck Zepeda and Cohen 2006). For Scenarios 2-4, we considered 
estimates of the cost of compliance with biosafety regulations and/or adaptive research and development 
(R&D). These costs may vary significantly between countries. 
Technology fee or premium 
The technology fee used in our model was based on literature review of fees charged to farmers in other 
Bt cotton adopting countries. Notice that West African countries are new markets for the innovators. We 
assumed a distribution with a minimum technology fee of US$15 per hectare, a most likely technology 
fee of US$ 32 per hectare and a maximum technology fee of US$ 56 per hectare. Furthermore, we 
arbitrarily reduced the technology fee for minimum, maximum and mode values in Scenario 4 by 40 
percent to 9, 19 and 34 dollars per hectare respectively, to reflect the potential of the negotiating power by 
farmer and marketing associations in West Africa.  
Scenarios 
We consider five hypothetical scenarios for potential adopting countries in West Africa, which can be 
influenced through government policies. These scenarios are designed to illustrate how certain factors 
affect the total benefits generated and the distribution of the benefits. One factor is the time lag associated 
with research and development (R&D) and biosafety regulatory compliance, which may be concurrent or 
sequential. Even when there is no time lag for adaptive research, varieties may still enter regular 
                                                 
8 Jaffe (2006) has a very good review of current biosafety systems in East Africa including a set of descriptors 
of a functional biosafety system and suggestions for a regional biosafety system framework.     16
performance trials or Plant Protection Quarantine processes while biosafety information is compiled. In 
each scenario, the time lag should be understood as the total time required for completing all of these 
processes when the processes are performed in the adopting country.   
A second factor affecting the distribution of benefits is the way the technology diffuses among 
countries in the region. For all economic surplus scenarios described below, with the exception of the 
baseline scenario, we assume that Burkina Faso leads in promoting the Bt cotton technology, and is 
followed later by Benin, Mali, Senegal, and Togo.
9 We needed to assume then that a time lag between the 
initial adoption in Burkina Faso and the rest of the (potential) adopting countries listed in West Africa. 
One potential avenue for further analysis is to examine the possibility of reducing this time lag, taking 
advantage of the biosafety information generated in Burkina Faso. 
A third factor is the technology fee that is charged to farmers. Here, technology fees are applied 
in all scenarios other than the baseline, Scenario 1. This implies that the Bt technology is developed or 
adapted via joint ventures between the gene and germplasm innovators and West African organizations. 
The model is constructed in such a way that scenarios can be easily modified. Scenarios are summarized 
next.  
Scenario 1: Baseline 
In the baseline scenario, there is no adoption of Bt cotton anywhere in West Africa, but adoption occurs in 
the Rest of the World (ROW). As a consequence, ROW countries are able to take advantage of the 
benefits of the technology. This evaluation is done over a period of 23 years. Adoption in ROW induces 
downward pressures on world cotton prices, benefiting consumers. Producer welfare in the ROW is 
adversely affected by lower prices, although this effect can be counterbalanced by the cost savings or 
damage reduction that result from successful use of the technology. Depending on the level of adoption 
and the relative value of these gains and losses, farmers in the ROW may benefit overall. In contrast, 
producer welfare in West Africa is negatively affected by the downward pressure on prices. The price 
effect on producers may be counterbalanced by gains to consumers, so that total surplus may still be 
positive. 
Scenario 2: Direct transfer of existing varieties by gene/germplasm innovator with conventional 
adoption patterns 
In this scenario, Burkina Faso, Benin, Mali, Senegal and Togo pursue the option of direct use of varieties 
that are available in international markets. While the strategy observed in Burkina Faso and elsewhere has 
                                                 
9 This is a realistic assumption as there may be significant technology flows to neighboring countries as 
happened between Argentina and Brazil with herbicide tolerant soybeans (Qaim and de Janvry, 2003).   17
been to backcross their (private) varieties into local varieties as soon as possible, this scenario is used to 
showcase the effect of time lags. The research lag is shorter compared to either Scenarios 3 or 4 because 
existing varieties can be readily deployed in West Africa. This scenario also assumes a technology fee 
that varies between US$15- US$56 per hectare. Technology fees for Bt cotton have varied significantly 
across countries. The range reported in the literature has been between US$15 and US$80 per hectare (see 
Falck-Zepeda et al. 2000a and 2000b; Huang et al. 2003; Bennett et al. 2004; Huang et al. 2004). We use 
a lower upper bound, which could reflect either a strategy by the innovator to penetrate the West African 
market or is a consequence of the negotiating power of national stakeholders (i.e. farmer associations).  
Scenario 3: West Africa adopts West African varieties backcrossed with private sector lines  
Under scenario 3, studied countries use the Bt cotton gene technology after adapting West African 
varieties to enable gene expression. This condition delays the stream of benefits because of the longer 
research and biosafety process required. Note that for this scenario the ‘most likely’ and ‘maximum’ yield 
differences have been increased to 25 and 45 percent. This 25 percent increase in yield difference with 
respect to Scenario 2 values reflects better adapted varieties.  This scenario implies then a longer time lag, 
which is 6 years for Burkina Faso. Other adoption countries adopt the technology 3 years after Burkina 
Faso, to permit their own regulatory process. In this case, if the data generated in Burkina Faso is 
accepted by other countries in the region, there may be an opportunity to reduce the overall time lag for 
adoption. Given the experience of countries that have already adopted Bt cotton, we consider that this to 
be an optimistically brief time lag. A more realistic time lag could be a decade. In the case of Burkina 
Faso the decision to explore use of Bt cotton occurred in 2001, and we have timed our simulations to 
begin on this date.  
Scenario 4: West Africa adopts West African varieties backcrossed with private sector lines with 
reduced premiums compared to Scenario 3 
In this scenario, we illustrate the effect of reducing the technology fee in all adopting countries through 
negotiations between the innovator, farmer unions and marketing associations. We chose an arbitrary 40 
percent reduction to showcase the effect of a decrease in the overall level of potential technology fees 
charged to producers in West Africa. The maximum adoption rate is also increased to 50 percent, to 
reflect the response of farmers to the lower seed prices that result from a lower technology fee. The rest of 
the assumptions made in Scenario 3 are held constant.    18
Scenario 5: Fluctuating adoption in Mali and Benin  
We use the example of Benin and Mali to illustrate how abrupt policy or institutional changes can affect 
the benefits that are generated through fluctuating adoption rates. Mali and Benin, in particular, have 
advanced in liberalizing and reforming their cotton marketing channel following different approaches 
(Figures 1, 2, and 3).  Diffusion paths, expressed as the percentage of farmers using, or area planted to, 
the new technology may be irregular (Smale et al. 1991; Morris et al. 1999; Gouse, et al. 2005), although 
it is common to assume that they are smooth and sigmoid in shape (like an “S”). In general, farmers 
usually need to adapt new technologies to their own conditions and during this process they may decide to 
reject the technology. In sub-Saharan Africa and regions with developing economies, external shocks 
(extreme weather conditions, social and political turmoil) and institutional change also affect the supply 
and demand for technology.  
Results   
Scenario 1 
When West Africa chooses not to adopt Bt cotton while the ROW does, the ROW (and particularly 
producers in the ROW) continue to benefit from cost savings and reduced yield damage. In contrast, 
producers in the West African countries endure the price decreases caused by adoption of Bt in the ROW, 
without the counterbalancing effect of earning benefits from use of the technology. Column 2 in Tables 5 
and 6 presents the mean values of economic surplus from the 10,000 iterations estimated during the 
simulation of Scenario 1. Values in Table 5 are expressed as current values, whereas those in Table 6 are 
expressed in present values. 
Although not reported in Table 5, producer surplus is negative across all the study countries in 
West Africa. The total economic surplus in Scenario 1 is also negative for each of the study countries 
because producer losses are not compensated by consumer gains, because the rate of domestic 
consumption of cotton in the study countries is relatively low.  
The model output (of 10,000 iterations) provides the basis for estimating probability distributions. 
Examples of probability distributions for total economic surplus and producer and consumer surplus are 
shown in Figures 4-6 in present value terms.  
In Scenario 1, there is a high probability (99.5 percent) that total economic surplus in the study 
countries in West Africa will be negative, and that producer surplus in Burkina Faso will be negative 
(92.6 percent). Similar results are obtained with respect to the other countries included in our study. On 
the other hand, benefits to consumers tend to be positive and even high depending on how much cotton   19
they demand internally. Senegal for instance is a large domestic consumer of cotton (see Figure 6). The 
expected consumer surplus in Senegal is positive, with a small probability of a negative outcome.  
Scenario 2 
In this Scenario adopters in West Africa are able to earn benefits from the use of Bt cotton. Producer 
surplus increases relative to Scenario 1. Total economic surplus, expressed in present values, is also 
positive. Results of simulations made for Scenario 2 are shown in column 3 of Tables 5 and 6.  
Probability distributions of total economic surplus are shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8 for the 
study countries in the region and Burkina Faso, respectively.  
Not surprisingly, the probabilities of negative present values of total economic surplus and 
producer surplus are much lower than in Scenario 1, and fluctuate between 4 and 8 percent. Similar 
results are obtained for other adopting countries in the region. Figure 9 shows the probability distribution 
of consumer surplus in Senegal. Results are as expected.  
We see a pattern emerging when we examine Scenarios 1 and 2. Although the numbers in Tables 
5 and 6 indicate that economic surpluses are generally positive in scenario 2, they mask significant 
variability at the individual country level. Figures 4 through 8 (and some figures generated for other 
countries in the study that are not reproduced here) reveal that the probability that producer surplus is 
negative (downside risk) varies significantly between countries and scenarios. The simulations suggest, 
therefore, that Scenario 2 generates considerable financial risk for farmers. These risks may be greater 
than with the base scenario.  It is worthwhile to point out that we have assumed a 100 percent probability 
of success of the research and biosafety approval processes. Lower probabilities of success, which imply 
a longer lag period (i.e. for biosafety assessments and adaptive R&D), would augment the financial risk 
indicated here.  
Scenario 3 
Scenario 3 introduces the possibility of backcrossing the Bt gene into West African varieties. The 
immediate consequence of backcrossing is an increase in the time lag relative to Scenario 2 due to 
additional adaptive research, and possibly, a longer biosafety approval process. Average economic 
surplus present values for Scenario 3 are shown in column 4 of Tables 6. We observe a slight increase in 
the overall level of benefits as well as the surplus earned by producers and consumers. The small 
increment in benefits with respect to Scenario 2 was 3 percent overall and 8 percent for producers in the 
five study countries of West Africa. In the case of Burkina Faso the increment was higher (10 percent 
overall and 20 percent for producers). We can interpret these findings in two ways. On one hand, the 
benefits of having appropriate varieties may compensate for the additional lag needed to develop them.   20
On the other hand, we can speculate that the benefits from this strategy could be higher if West Africa 
managed to improve the efficiency of the R&D and biosafety regulatory system, thus reducing the time 
lag.  
Figure 10 presents the probability distribution of total economic surplus for West Africa under the 
conditions laid out in Scenario 3.  
We observe a very small reduction in the probability of obtaining negative outcomes with respect to 
scenario 2. This observation is supported by Figure 11, showing the probability distribution for producer 
surplus in Burkina Faso. The probability of obtaining a negative outcome in Burkina Faso is reduced from 
8.3 percent in Scenario 2 to 5.8 percent in Scenario 3.  
Average benefits to the cotton sector are summarized by sector actor (producer, consumer, and 
innovator) and country in Table 7. The main conclusion is that there are significant differences among 
countries in terms of the overall magnitude of economic benefits. Between Scenarios 2 and 3, there is 
little change in terms of either average numbers or the risk profile for consumers in Senegal (Table 7 and 
Figure 12).  
As this is a very important strategy for study countries in West Africa, we conducted a regression 
in @Risk to examine the sensitivity of these results to the assumptions that underlay the structural model. 
Results are shown in Figure 13 for the case of Burkina Faso.   Not surprisingly, the levels of expected 
producer surplus are most heavily influenced in Scenario 3 by yield performance in the rest of the world 




Average benefits (over 10,000 iterations) are presented in Tables 5, 6, and 8 for Scenario 4. Overall, we 
observe an increase in the level of benefits earned by consumers and producers in West Africa, while 
innovators lose benefits. 
This pattern results from the lower technology fees paid to the innovators, lower seed prices, and 
higher adoption levels.  The lesson is that negotiating technology fees will have an impact on the overall 
level of benefits to the cotton sector, and not just to producers and innovators.  
                                                 
10 An additional step, not presented here, was an advanced sensitivity analysis of the simulation results presented for 
scenario 3 and 4. In this advanced sensitivity analysis, we allowed positive and negative 10% change for four steps for key 
parameters. For each one of these steps we generated 10,000 iterations. There were a total of 56 simulations done. In general, 
results seem to be fairly robust to changes in distribution parameters. 
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A crucial finding expressed in Figures 14-16 is that the probability of obtaining a negative 
outcome has declined relative to other scenarios, reducing financial risk to the cotton sectors of study 
countries.  
It is important to remember though that there are many types of risk to which cotton producers 
and consumers in the region are exposed, which are not considered in this model. These include risks 
associated with credit and marketing, for which institutional considerations such as the structure of the 
market channel are foremost. As explained in the methods section, such considerations are difficult to 
build into a model of this type.  
Sensitivity analyses were also performed for this scenario. Figure 17 illustrates for the case of 
Burkina Faso the sensitivity of expected producer surplus to variation in the parameters of the structural 
model. Overall, findings are fairly consistent with Scenario 3, lending indirect support to the robustness 
of the analysis made for the different scenarios in Burkina Faso and West Africa. Results of the sensitivity 
analysis for consumer surplus in Senegal are shown in Figure 18.  
While many factors appear to play a role, variable that have the greatest influence on economic 
benefits are: 1) yield advantage of Bt cotton in ROW, 2) price elasticity, and 3) cost differentials.  
Scenario 5 
Irregular adoption rates in Benin and Mali have a negative impact on producer surplus and total economic 
surplus in West Africa as compared to Scenarios 2, 3, and 4, (Column 6, Table 5). In comparison to 
Scenario 4 both, a reduction in consumer surplus and a increase in surplus earned by innovators are 
observed. Average results by country and actor are shown in Table 9.    
Examination of the probability distributions of producer surplus confirms that in this model, the 
risk of negative producer surplus induced by external shocks that affect adoption can be as high as 40 
percent in Mali and Benin. The probability of negative producer surplus is lower for Senegal (20 percent), 
but remains substantial. In the other countries, effects on producer surplus appear to be more of a 
consequence of time lags assumed in the simulations. In contrast, consumer surplus remains almost 
unaffected by irregularity of adoption, because consumers benefit from the adoption of Bt cotton in the 
ROW. Notice that consumers are mostly located in the ROW. 
Rates of Return and Distribution of Benefits 
Table 10 shows the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for individual countries for Scenarios 3, 4 and 5.    In 
most cases, although the IRR is higher than interest rates used in our simulations, it is relatively low 
compared to usual estimates of rates of return to technology adoption. This result is probably due to the 
conservative estimates employed for yield and cost advantages associated with the technology, combined   22
with the relatively high technology fees assumed. Still, we had sound reasons for caution, given the 
experiences of other developing countries.   Benefits are partitioned by actors in the cotton sector in Table 
11.   
Our estimates show that, when the study countries are considered as a group, producers and 
innovators earn the largest share of the benefits from the adoption of Bt cotton, while consumers benefit 
little. Similar patterns have been documented in other studies of Bt cotton (Falck-Zepeda et al. 2000). 
Nonetheless, the situation is not uniform for either the individual countries included in our study, or 
between scenarios. In Scenario 3, where West African lines are backcrossed with private sector lines, 
innovators tend to earn a larger share of the predicted surplus than producers. In Scenario 4, with reduced 
premiums, the opposite is true. Again, we attribute the partitioning of benefits that is evident in Scenario 
3 to the fairly conservative assumptions used in our simulations concerning the potential farm-level 
benefits of Bt cotton in West Africa.  
Results from other simulations 
We also estimated three additional scenarios. We present some qualitative results to support the 
conclusions already presented in the scenarios discussed previously. The first alternative scenario is the 
possibility of licensing Chinese varieties for use in West Africa. The Chinese national system has been 
working on Bt cotton for several years and has released Bt cotton varieties that could be adapted to West 
African conditions. This scenario contemplated the possibility of China becoming a major GM 
technology provider via the licensing of their varieties. The assumptions included a lower technology fee 
that ranges between US$ 15 and $30 per hectare and a different productivity potential (slightly lower) 
from that assumed in the direct transfer scenario. The main lesson from this scenario was that reduced 
technology fees can compensate for lowered productivity from the use of less-than-fully-adapted 
varieties.  
The second and third scenarios were variations of Scenarios 2 and 3, assuming different 
regulatory lags and the absence of a technology fee due to release by the public sector. The crucial 
importance of negotiating the technology fee was reinforced in these scenarios.  One additional 
conclusion was that holding other factors constant longer time lags associated with research, development 
and biosafety regulatory processes have a tendency to decrease net present gains for both producers and 
innovators.  
Result Limitations and Opportunities for Further Research 
In the results presented here, there are “winners” and “losers” from the adoption of the technology. All 
non-adopting farmers in the aggregate are assumed to lose from the use of the technology by adopting   23
farmers. This a result of the decrease in the cotton lint price, keeping everything else constant, induced by 
the shift of the supply curve. It is worthwhile noting a positive producer surplus estimate really means 
that in the aggregate adopting farmers gained from using the technology. Individually farmers may still 
lose from using the technology even if the overall outcome (producer surplus) is positive. 
In the economic model used in this paper, a decrease in cotton lint prices translates into a gain for 
consumers from the introduction of the technology. In some cases however yield and cost advantages may 
not be sufficiently large to compensate for the technology fee paid by farmers. Note furthermore that in 
the model, innovators gain if there is adoption by farmers. Our assumption of the technology fee being a 
proxy for the temporary monopolistic rents obtained by the innovator results then in gross margins. We 
have not adjusted these rents to account for costs of introducing the technology nor compliance with the 
biosafety regulation and legal fees in a particular country. 
It is important to point out that the possibility that other minor pests may become economically 
important is high. This is especially relevant considering that the range of pests controlled by the Bt 
protein is limited to Lepidopteran insects. Often broad-spectrum insecticides are used to controls 
Lepidopteran insects. If these major pests are reduced then the use of broad spectrum insecticide would as 
well reduce and thus the population of minor pest would increase. This fact points to the need of using 
locally adapted varieties to insert the Bt gene. These varieties will have broader resistance to other pests 
and diseases endemic to the region. Incorporating these concepts into the estimation spreadsheet and 
model used in this study poses some challenges. The first is the paucity of methodological approaches to 
measure input abatement effects ex ante. The second, and most important, limitation is the need for 
production data that carefully compares Bt and conventional technologies, such as those based on 
comparison of an isogenic line with its GM counterpart, and careful productivity studies that seek to 
understand Bt and conventional technologies produced with and without binding constraints. This implies 
carefully measuring actual and potential yields estimates for Bt and conventional technologies in situ, 
identifying binding constraints to yield and characterizing cost comparisons between technologies.    24
6.  CONSIDERATIONS FOR ECONOMICS RESEARCH IN WEST AFRICA  
In this study we have estimated the potential impact of the deployment of insect resistant cotton in 
selected countries in West Africa using different scenarios. We have used the best available 
methodological approaches in order to overcome some of the limitations of the economic surplus model.  
The common approach was expanded in order to consider the effects of risk and the variability of 
outcomes and uncertainty on the values of key parameters due to data sparseness. The goal was to further 
develop the economic surplus model as part of a suite of proposed methodological elements that can be 
implemented with West African scientists and stakeholders in their countries. These methodologies can 
provide additional data and analysis to elucidate the relationship between innovation, technology progress 
and adoption and poverty issues in West Africa. In particular, the tools proposed here can help decision 
makers define their policy options and choose best development strategies for the cotton sector.  
A range of potential issues may ultimately determine the level and distribution of economic 
benefits in those countries adopting (or not) Bt cotton in West Africa. On one hand, under the 
assumptions of the model, all countries included in the evaluation, except the ROW, are worse off by not 
adopting Bt cotton. On the other hand, the net benefits of adopting Bt for some scenarios seem to be small 
even after including the innovator surplus. The conservative assumptions used in our model and the 
downward effect on prices caused by adoption rates coupled with the high number of hectares planted in 
the rest of the world may account for these results.  
Preliminary findings appear to reinforce the perceived need for decision-makers in West Africa to 
re-examine whether or not the technology needs to be adapted if only to “catch-up” technologically with 
other major cotton-producers of the world. The downward pressure on global prices of high adoption rates 
in the ROW creates a distinct possibility that West African countries will have to adopt the technology 
just to be able to compete in a global market. Thus, the issue of how and where to set the price (and 
particularly setting the level of technology premium for using the technology, as shown in Scenario 4) 
becomes crucial to the appropriate deployment of the technology. This fact cannot be overstated.  
Burkina Faso seems to be the country closest to adopting Bt cotton in West Africa, having taken 
the lead in conducting confined field trials of Bt cotton which have been conducted already in 2004 and 
2005. Because of this fact, Burkina Faso was assigned a leading (first mover) role in our simulations. A 
leader role translated into a greater potential to capture higher levels of producer surplus. In contrast, 
gains in consumer surplus are low because West Africa is largely a net exporter with low rates of internal 
consumption. The largest rate of consumption in-country is in Senegal (13 percent of the total produced), 
but in absolute numbers, the highest consumption of locally- produced cotton is in Benin, which benefits 
with the highest consumer surpluses in each of the scenarios.    25
Across all studies discussed around the world, a significant share of the expected economic 
benefits from the adoption of the technology is earned by producers. According to our simulation, 
however, this finding does not hold for the study countries of West Africa. Here, a larger share of the 
benefits often accrues to the innovator. We hypothesize that this result may also be a consequence of the 
conservative assumptions used in the model. Thus, this finding emphasizes the need for West African 
stakeholders to focus on the technology price-setting mechanism, and to consider the full range of 
technology transfer options.   
Scenario 5 (irregular adoption) serves to illustrate the point that policy-makers need to begin to 
address the technical, biophysical and institutional issues that could cause fluctuating rates of adoption 
before -rather than after- the release of Bt cotton. In this scenario, potential producer benefits are lost 
during the period of dis-adoption. This affects not only total benefits but also the distribution of benefits, 
shifting a larger share to the innovator. The adoption pattern and the length of the adoption period both 
affect the share of benefits earned by producers as compared to innovators. A longer adoption period 
would probably translate into larger shares of benefits transmitted to producers. This result illustrates the 
importance of decision makers in West Africa addressing the stability of cotton market channels during 
the process of reform in the region. The results as well take into consideration the effect that ongoing 
reforms may have on the strength of seed demand and the vulnerability of farmers to fluctuations in seed 
and product prices and farm income.  
An overarching concern was to identify the factors and determinants of benefits created by the 
potential use of Bt cotton technologies in West Africa at different levels. The objective was to support 
regulators, decision makers and national governments in identifying strategies and options and 
systematically assessing the Bt cotton innovation. This paper supports those efforts by providing a set of 
tools to do such work in a specific country at a finer degree of detail.   
Do farmers in West Africa potentially gain from the introduction of the Bt cotton technology? 
Taking into consideration the limitation of this study and the caveats described in the paper of not 
including important environmental and economic effects in our calculation, there does appear to be real 
potential for some farmers to gain from the technology. The share of farmers that stand to gain from the 
introduction of Bt cotton technology will be largely influenced by whether or not national governments 
and technology innovator support appropriate incentives and address institutional and socio-economic 
issues that may limit benefits to be captured by poor smallholder farmers in West Africa. Therefore, 
knowledge and knowledge flows to and from farmers will play a critical role in the proper deployment of 
the technology.  26
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14  Benin  -  8.8  128.0 37.6%  72.6%  369.9 412.7 
11 Burkina 
Faso 
250 6.9  68.0  51.4%  70.6%  395.4  414.4 
26 Cameroon  200  1.3  93.5  5.4% 19.6%  205.7  202.3 
17 Côte 
d’Ivoire 
150  1.7  151.4 3.4%  6.0%  303.8 328.2 
75 Gambia  -  -  0.1 1.3% 1.6%  1  0.4 
48 Ghana  -  -  4.9 0.2% 0.5%  29.7  20.7 
44 Guinea  -  -  2.0 0.3% 7.4%  41.9  50.3 
65 Guinea-
Bissau 
-  -  2.5 4.4% 3.7%  3.5 4.4 
10  Mali  400  5  172.4 25%  62.1%  459.8 497.8 
67 Niger  -  -  -  0.2% 0.6%  2.8 10 
8 Nigeria  -  -  13.3  0.2%  7.9%  582.2  400.8 
47  Senegal  -  -  10.8 2.0%  8.6%  36.3 40.8 
19 Chad -  5.1  -  36.2%  58.7%  283.5  184.0 
30 Togo 200  -  35.6  11.1%  41.1%  167.3  57.5 
TOTAL       745.4  -  -  2900.3  2783.2 
Source: FAOSTAT 2000-2004; WDI World Bank 2004; Coton et Development (1999) 























Nigeria X  X    X    3-4 
Mali X      X  X  5 
Burkina Faso  X  X    X    7-8 
Benin X  X        6 
Côte d’Ivoire  X  X    X    6 
Chad X      X    5 
Cameroon X  X  X  X    5 
Source: Oerke, et al. 2004; Compiled by Patricia Zambrano. 
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Table 3. Annual gross income to gene/germplasm innovator from charging a per hectare technology 
fee assuming 100%, 60% and 20% adoption levels in West Africa 
Income from technology fee 
with 100% adoption 
  Income from technology fee  
with 60% adoption 
  Income from technology fee 














Benin  5,447,605   29,053,893     3,268,563  17,432,336    1,089,521  5,810,779  
Burkina Faso  4,834,145   25,782,107     2,900,487   15,469,264        966,829  5,156,421  
Cameroon  3,042,790   16,228,213     1,825,674     9,736,928        608,558   3,245,643  
C. African Rep.    500,930     2,671,627       300,558     1,602,976        100,186     534,325  
Chad  4,386,765   23,396,080     2,632,059   14,037,648        877,353   4,679,216  
Congo, D.R.  1,040,000     5,546,667       624,000     3,328,000       208,000   1,109,333  
Côte d'Ivoire  4,473,955   23,861,093     2,684,373  14,316,656       894,791   4,772,219  
Gambia      10,920         58,240            6,552      34,944          2,184   11,648  
Ghana    521,000    2,778,667        312,600   1,667,200       104,200   55,733  
Guinea    697,500    3,720,000        418,500   2,232,000       139,500   744,000  
Guinea-Bissau      51,500      274,667          30,900      164,800         10,300   54,933  
Mali  6,045,665   32,243,547     3,627,399   19,346,128     1,209,133   6,448,709  
Mauritania       40,000   213,333          24,000       128,000            8,000   42,667  
Nigeria  8,455,000   45,093,333     5,073,000   27,056,000     1,691,000   9,018,667  
Senegal     446,220   2,379,840        267,732     1,427,904          89,244      475,968  
Togo  2,256,705   12,035,760     1,354,023     7,221,456       451,341   2,407,152  
Total   42,250,715   225,337,147     25,350,435   135,202,320      8,450,155   45,067,493  
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Table 4a. Assumptions used in the estimation of economic surplus model for the adoption of Bt 
cotton in West Africa  
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see Figure 3. 
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7 7 7 7 7 Own  (subjective) 
Assumptions 
        
Years to dis-
adopt 
0 5 5 5 5 Own  (subjective) 
assumptions 
        
Total years 
simulation 
23 23 24 24 24 Sum  of  all 
components of 
adoption pattern 
Notes: WA = West Africa, ROW=Rest of the World.   29
Table 4b. Continued 
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Table 4b. Continued 




















































Note: The Triangular probability distributions used in the simulations are fully described by minimum, mode and maximum 
values. In the table above values for these three parameters are included in parentheses in each cell of this table, when 
appropriate.  
Table 5. Level and distribution of economic surplus in West Africa and Burkina Faso by scenario 
(Millions US$) 
 Scenario  1 
No adoption in 
West Africa- 
adoption rest 


























West  Africa         
Producers -77.6  190.5  199.7  208.3  145.9 
Consumers  1.4 1.5 1.56 1.7  1.5 
Innovators 0  219.3  219.3  131.5  188.7 
Total surplus  -76.2  410.9  420.1  341.1  335.7 
         
Burkina  Faso         
Producers -19.3  47.4  56.7  58.6  51.2 
Consumers  0.4 0.4 0.4  0.4  0.4 
Innovator 0  54.9  54.9  32.9  54.9 
Total Surplus  -19.0  102.6  111.9  91.9  106.5 
Note: Data presented here are actual current values. Note that the values for producer, consumer and innovator surplus do not add 
to the value for total surplus shown in the table. Value for all the components of surplus presented in each cell of this table are the 
average of the 10,000-25 000 iterations for each scenario.   31
Table 6. Level and distribution of the present value of economic surplus in West Africa and 
Burkina Faso by Scenario (Millions US$) 
 Scenario  1 
No adoption in 
West Africa- 
Adoption rest 


























West  Africa         
Producers -28.1  30.4  32.9  33.6  20 
Consumers  0.5 0.5 0.6  0.6  0.5 
Innovators 0  47.9  48.  28.8  37 
Total Surplus  -27.7  78.7  81.1  62.8  58 
         
Burkina  Faso         
Producers -7.0  10.9  13.4  13.8  13.5 
Consumers  0.1 0.1 0.1  0.1  0.1 
Innovators 0  14.8  14.7  8.9  14.7 
Total Surplus  -6.9  25.7  28.3  22.7  28.3 
Note: Data presented here are expressed in present values. Note that the values for producer, consumer and innovator surplus do 
not add to the value for total surplus shown in the table as the values presented in each cell of this table are the average of the 
10,000-25,000 iterations for each scenario. 
Table 7. Average present values of economic benefits to the cotton sector, by sector actor and 
country, Scenario 3 (Values in US$) 








Benin 7,397,656  11,381,600  203,629  18,931,930  7,550,328 
Bf 13,452,700  14,778,650  139,729  28,303,260  13,524,610 
Mali 8,416,729  15,339,090  102,146 23,811,640 8,472,551 
Senegal 553,824  1,305,254  91,535  1,904,289  599,035 
Togo 3,045,468  5,172,745  20,321  8,192,210  3,019,465 
Row 4,073,093,000  2,794,727,000  1,477,385,000  8,345,204,000  5,550,478,000 
Note: The values for producer, consumer and innovators surplus do not add to the value for total surplus and total surplus without 
innovator shown in the table. Value for all the components of surplus presented in each cell of this table are the average of the 
10,000-25,000 iterations for each scenario. 
Table 8. Average present values of economic benefits to the cotton sector, by sector actor and 
country, Scenario 4 (Values in US$) 






 Total Surplus 
Without Innovator  
Total Surplus 
Benin 7,579,815  6,828,961  223,300  14,581,120  7,752,158 
Bf 13,789,120  8,867,198  153,230  22,747,890 13,880,690 
Mali 8,525,793  9,203,451  112,017  17,794,940  8,591,486 
Senegal 560,684  783,151  100,379  1,397,890  614,739 
Togo 3,167,267  3,103,650  22,284  6,246,877  3,143,227 
Row 4,441,543,000  2,794,728,000  1,619,545,000  8,855,815,000  6,061,088,000 
Note: The values for producer, consumer and innovators surplus do not add to the value for total surplus and total surplus without 
innovator shown in the table. Value for all the components of surplus presented in each cell of this table are the average of the 
10,000-25,000 iterations for each scenario.   32
Table 9. Average present values of economic benefits to the cotton sector, by sector actor and 
country, Scenario 5 (Values in US$) 






 Total Surplus 
Without Innovator  
Total Surplus 
Benin 2,307,335  7,415,446  202,151 9,873,975  2,458,529 
Bf 13,499,500  14,778,660  138,715  28,349,060  13,570,390 
Mali 848,027  9,085,328 101,405  9,988,436  903,108 
Senegal 557,971  1,305,253  90,870  1,907,769  602,517 
Togo 3,065,317  5,172,746 20,174  8,211,913  3,039,167 
Total For 5 
Wa 
Countries 
20,278,150 37,757,433  553,314  58,331,153  20,573,710 
Row 4,078,755,000  2,794,726,000  1,465,509,000  8,338,990,000  5,544,264,000 
Note: The values for producer, consumer and innovators surplus do not add to the value for total surplus and total surplus without 
innovator shown in the table. Value for all the components of surplus presented in each cell of this table are the average of the 
10,000-25,000 iterations for each scenario.  
Table 10. Internal rate of return (IRR) Scenarios 3, 4 and 5 (%) 
Scenario 3  Scenario 4  Scenario 5  Country 
Ts   Tsi  Ts  Tsi  Ts   Tsi 
Benin 28    21 25  20  14   20 
Burkina Faso  44   32  38  31  32   44 
Mali 27    19 24  18  12   18 
Senegal 29    19 25  19  19   29 
Togo 28    20 24  19  20   28 
Note: 1) TS = Total Surplus without innovator surplus, TSi= Total Surplus including innovator surplus. 2) Shares have been 
rounded to next whole number. 
Table 11. Percent (%) share of benefits to sector actors, by country, Scenarios 3, 4 and 5 
Scenario 3  Scenario 4  Scenario 5  Country 
Ps   Is  Cs  Ps   Is  Cs  Ps   Is  Cs 
Benin  39   60   1   52   47   1   23   75   2  
Burkina Faso  47   52   <1   60   39   <1   48   52   <1  
Mali  35   64   <1   48   52   <1   8   91   1  
Senegal  28   67   5   39   54   7   29   68   5  
Togo  37   63   <1   50   49   <1   37   63   <1  
5 Countries 
Wa 
40   59   <1   53   46   1.0   35   65   <1  
Note: Shares have been rounded to next whole number.    33
Figure 1. Historical cotton performance - Mali 
 
Figure 2. Historical cotton performance - Benin 
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Figure 3. Stylized fluctuating adoption path due to endogenous characteristics and exogenous 
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Figure 4. Distribution of present value of total surplus, Scenario 1, West Africa  
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Figure 6. Distribution of present value of consumer surplus, Scenario 1, Senegal  
 
 
Figure 7. Distribution of present value of total surplus, Scenario 2, West Africa  
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Figure 8. Distribution of present value of producer surplus, Scenario 2, Burkina Faso  
 
 



















-20 -10  01 0   20 30 40 50 60 70







































-50  0 50 100 150 200 250 






















  38 
 
 
Figure 10. Distribution of present value of total surplus, Scenario 3, West Africa 
 
Figure 11. Distribution of present value of producer surplus, Scenario 3, Burkina Faso  
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Figure 12. Distribution of present value of consumer surplus, Scenario 3, Senegal  
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Std b Coefficients 40 
 
 
Figure 14. Distribution of total surplus in present value, Scenario 4, West Africa 
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Figure 16. Distribution of consumer surplus in present value, including innovators, Scenario 4, 
Senegal 
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APPENDIX A.  
The Bt cotton technology and its global status 
The first gene used in Bt cotton (commercial name BollgardTM), known as Cry1Ac, was developed by 
Monsanto in the 1980s from a soil microorganism, Bacillus thuringiensis kurstaki, long known to produce 
a protein that is toxic to a limited number of genus and species of Lepidopteran insects when ingested. Bt 
cotton was first sold in the United States in 1996 and was developed through a strategic alliance between 
Monsanto and the dominant U.S. seed cotton firm, Delta and Pineland (D&PL).  Subsequent innovations 
included the stacking or insertion of two or more genes into the cotton germplasm. For example, 
Monsanto’s Bollgard IITM uses Cry1Ac and Cry2Ab. The WidestrikeTM technology of Dow 
Agrosciences uses Cry1Ac and Cry1F. More recent Bt formulations, such as Syngenta’s VIP cotton, carry 
the VIP 3A gene.  
The primary targets of the original Bt cotton releases included the tobacco budworm (Heliothis 
virescens), pink bollworm (Pectinophora gossypiela) and cotton bollworm (Helicoverpa armigera and 
Helicoverpa zea) Lepidopterans. However, the original Bt cotton release demonstrated only limited 
activity against other pests such as beet armyworms (Spodoptera exigua Hubner), soybean loopers 
(Pseudoplusia Includens Walker) and other bollworms. The range of control has been extended through 
the introduction of BollgardII and Widestrike, or through the introduction of new chemistries such as VIP 
cotton.  
If these pests are present at high densities or populations persist for an extended period, 
supplemental insecticide applications may be needed to prevent further yield losses. Furthermore, even 
when there is adequate control of the target pests, secondary pests that used to be controlled – albeit 
indirectly – when controlling the target pest may become economically significant. For example in the 
U.S., other bollworms and stink bugs have increased in importance after several years of using Bt cotton 
technologies (Bacheler and Mott, 2005). Recently, Wang et al. (2006) presented evidence of secondary 
pest evolution in China, though it is refuted by Huang et al. (2006).  In any case, secondary pest evolution 
is a well known issue in breeding and managing plant genetic resistance, which needs to be addressed as 
early as possible through variety release plans and regulatory approval processes. Integrated Pest 
Management (IPM) practices, scouting techniques, and agronomic management practices must keep pace 
with a changing pest population. 
Hence, one critical issue is the need to recommend insect resistance management practices along 
with the Bt cotton variety.  Bt expression introduces selective pressures on a pest population. Eventually, 
individual pests that are resistant to the Bt protein will survive and thrive, rendering the technology 
obsolete. To lengthen the time until resistance is overcome, various strategies have been devised. One  44 
 
 
successful strategy to date has been setting aside areas planted with non Bt cotton varieties where resistant 
individuals mate with non-resistant individuals, thus diluting the proportion of resistant individuals. The 
set aside is called a refugia. There are different variations in terms of whether farmers are allowed to 
spray for non-target insects in the refugia and the relative area dedicated to the set aside. As indicated 
before, the refugia have been successful so far in delaying the appearance of resistance to the Bt gene 
under field conditions. Bt cotton was introduced back in 1996 and so far no case of resistance has been 
observed.  
Another critical issue is the possibility of incidental gene transfer to wild cotton populations. 
Although this possibility is remote, some countries have chosen to limit the areas where Bt cotton is 
planted. In the U.S., Bt cotton varieties are not permitted for cultivation in the Southern part of Florida, 
Hawaii, U.S. Virgin Islands or Puerto Rico. In Mexico, Bt cotton varieties are not permitted for 
cultivation in the southern states as there are wild relatives of cotton in the region. Interestingly enough, 
the possibility that modern cotton varieties will be able to sexually cross with wild relatives is very low, 
as most modern varieties include.  




The most widely used source for GM crop areas are the data reported in James’ annual reviews 
(1996- 2005). The distribution between GM cotton and all other GM crops, expressed as a 
percent of total (worldwide area) is shown in Figure A-1. GM cotton share of total area planted 
to GM crops has remained fairly stable at 10 percent or less.  
                                                 
11 Patricia Zambrano is a Senior Research Analyst at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).  45 
 
 
Figure A.1.  Area under GM cotton as a proportion of total Worldwide GM area (mill Ha) 
 
Source: James (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005) 
Table A.1.  GM cotton areas by technology 
GM cotton areas 







         Million hectares  % 
1996 0.8  0.8    <0.1     
1997  1.5 1.1  <0.1 0.4     
1998 2.5           
1999  3.7 1.3  0.8 1.6     
2000  5.3 1.5  1.7 2.1  25  16 
2001  6.8 1.9  2.4 2.5  34  20 
2002  6.8 2.4  2.2 2.2  34  20 
2003  7.2 3.1  2.6 1.5  34  21 
2004  9.0 4.5  3 1.5  32  28 
2005  9.8           35  28 
Source: James (1997,1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005) 
In his reports, James does not report adoption by crop and by country, except for scattered data in 
the text. In addition, the data presented by James is for area planted to cotton, making it difficult to 
compare this information with other sources who usually report harvested area. It is a well known fact 
that planted and harvested areas can be substantially different due to losses between both events. 
Comparisons with other data sources is further complicated by the fact that cotton in many developing 
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of the data presented by James, we also present data collected by the International Cotton Advisory 
Committee (ICAC) data in Table A.2.  
Table A.2.  Area planted to GM cotton 
GM cotton areas    GM cotton adoption rates   Country 
2002/3 2003/4  2004/05 2005/06 2006/07  2002/3 2003/4 2004/05  2005/06 
  Thousand hectares    percentage 
                 
Argentina           7.31          15.29          37.46           61.00           88.00   5.0  6.0  10.0 20.0 
Australia         66.15        117.90        188.40         293.40         225.00   30.0  60.0  60.0  90.0 
Brazil              34.28         150.00         4.0 
China     2,133.84     2,962.93     3,700.45      3,542.00      3,817.43   51.0  58.0  65.0  70.0 
Colombia             5.49          11.33           28.92           25.94     10.0  14.0  50.0 
India         38.34          97.88        465.66      1,242.22      3,984.38   0.5  1.3  5.3 14.0 
Indonesia           0.09            0.10            0.12       1.0  1.0  1.0   
Mexico         20.75          23.71          64.26           74.66           62.55   50.0  38.0  61.0  59.0 
South Africa         22.11          32.51          26.62           21.35           21.35   74.0  75.0  95.0  95.0 
USA    3,869.20     3,740.44     4,121.59      4,524.53      4,823.50   77.0  77.0  78.0  81.0 
                 
WORLD    6,157.79     6,996.25     8,615.89      9,822.36    13,198.15     20.6  21.8  24.4  29.1 
Source: ICAC, personal communication. Data for 2006/7 are initial estimations 
Table A.3 illustrates the evolution of GM adoption over time, according to data presented by 
James. Countries in this table are listed chronologically, according to the first year of adoption.  We 
notice that for the past four years non-industrialized countries, primarily from Latin America, have been 
added to the list of GM adopters. Interesting to note that after 1998, India and Colombia are the only two 
additional countries that have adopted GM cotton.  47 
 
 
Table A.3. Area planted to GM crops planted 1997 – 2005 (Million hectares) 
Years   Country 
   1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
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  Canola, Maize, Soybean 
Australia <  0.05 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3  Cotton 
Mexico  < 0.03  < 0.1  < 0.1  < 0.1  < 0.1  < 0.1  < 0.1  0.1  0.1  Cotton, Soybean 
Spain   -  < 0.1  < 0.1  < 0.1  < 0.1  < 0.1  < 0.1  0.1  0.1  Maize 




















 Maize,  Soybean,  Cotton 
Portugal  -  -  <  0.1       <0.1  Maize 
Romania  -  - <  0.1 <  0.1 <  0.1 <  0.1 <  0.1  0.1  0.1 Soybean 
Ukraine  -  -  <  0.1         
Uruguay  -  -  - <  0.1 <  0.1 <  0.1 <  0.1  0.3  0.3 Soybean,  Maize 
Germany  -  -  - <  0.1 <  0.1 <  0.1 <  0.1 <0.1 <0.1 Maize 
India  - - - - -  <  0.1  0.1  0.5  1.3  Cotton 
Bulgaria  - - - - -  <  0.1  <  0.1       
Indonesia  - - - - -  <  0.1  <  0.1       
Colombia  - - - - -  <  0.1  <  0.1  <0.1  <0.1  Cotton 
Honduras  - - - - -  <  0.1  <  0.1  <0.1  <0.1  Maize 
Brazil  - - - - - -  3.0  5.0  9.4  Soybean 
Paraguay  - - - - - - -  1.2  1.8  Soybean 
Iran  - - - - - - - -  <0.1  Rice 
Philippines  - - - - - -  <0.1  0.1  0.1  Maize 
Czech  Rep           <0.1   
Total  11.0 27.8 39.9 44.2 52.6 58.5 67.7 81.1 90.0     
Source: James (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005) 




The Economic Surplus Model 
Jose Falck-Zepeda 
Most ex post or ex ante analyses of the size and distribution of national economic benefits from adopting 
transgenic crops have been conducted with adaptations or versions of the economic surplus approach 
detailed by Alston and Pardey (1999). This approach is also termed a partial equilibrium displacement 
model because it considers only the effects of the technology change in the market where the technical 
change occurs. Effects in other markets, such as input markets, are disregarded.  
In the standard model, the estimated magnitude and distribution of the economic benefits depend 
on many factors. These include: a) price elasticities of supply and demand for the crop; b) the volume of 
production (whether the country is a large or small producer, price setter or price taker); c) trade issues, if 
the country exports or imports the crop; d) nature of the innovative change induced by the technology; e) 
uniqueness of crop attributes; and, f) relevance of traits for genetic enhancement (agronomic traits, traits 
for resistance to extreme weather conditions and/or to pest infestations). Data are typically drawn from 
some combination of sources including sample surveys of farmers, trial data (field and greenhouse), 
and/or secondary data. The analysis can be conducted at the regional, national, or global level.  
Several modifications of the basic economic surplus model have been proposed to deal with 
specific conditions encountered in either developed or developing countries. For example, when 
households are consumers as well as producers, and markets are incomplete, as is often the case for food 
crops in developing countries, supply of the product is difficult to separate from demand for the product. 
For example, Hayami and Herdt (1977) made an adjustment to the basic model for subsistence 
consumption in a country that does not trade the crop. The adjustment partitions the aggregate supply 
curve into partial supply curves in order to estimate differential effects on the income of farmers. This 
procedure allows for distinct rates of technical change and adoption among producer groups, particularly 
those that are classified by production size.    
The Alston Norton and Pardey (ANP) Economic Surplus Model 
A method to estimate economic surplus is proposed by Alston, Norton and Pardey. This model is based 
on the assumption that the adopting country markets and economy as well as the technological adoption 
pattern can be modeled by supply, demand and market equations as in the following system: 
(1) Supply:    QS = α +  β (P + k ) =  (α +β k ) +  β P 
(2) Demand:    QD = γ - δ P  49 
 
 
(3) Market  Clearing  QS =  QD 
where Qs is quantity supplied,  QD  is the quantity demanded, k is the shift in supply due to the 
introduction of the technology, and P is the equilibrium price. A graphical representation of this model is 
presented in Figure 1. The Market Clearing identity QS  =  QD allows us to estimate the equilibrium price 
P, by algebraic manipulation and by the areas identified as consumer and producer surplus in Figures 2a 
and 2b. The relative reduction in price (Z) is defined as  
(4) Z  =  ε K / [ε + η] = - (P1 – P0) / P0 
In these formulas ε  is the elasticity of supply, η is the absolute value of elasticity of demand, P0 is the 
pre-innovation price, and P1 is the post-innovation price. After setting QS  =  QD = Q,  the formula to 
estimate world price is P =  (γ  - α  -  β k) / (β + δ ). If k = 0,  P0 = (γ - α  ) / (β + δ ). If  k = KP0, P1 = (γ  -  
α  - β KP0) / (β + δ ), therefore the change in price, P1- P0 = - β K P0 / (β + δ ) and the absolute value of 
the relative change in price Z = - (P1- P0) / P0 = β K P0 / (β+ δ ). Multiplying the numerator and the 
denominator by P0 / Q0, and manipulating algebraically, yields the elasticity equivalent formula (4) above. 
For the closed economy model, geometrical and algebraic formulas for producer, consumer and total 
surplus are then: 
Changes in   Geometrical Formulas Algebraic  Formula 
Consumer Surplus  Δ CS = Area P0aeP1 = Area Rectangle P0abP1 + 
Area Triangle abe 
Δ CS = P0 Q0 Z (1 + 0.5 Z η )  
Producer Surplus  Δ PS = Area P1bcd = Area rectangle P1ecd + 
Area Triangle bce 
Δ PS = P0 Q0 (K - Z) (1 + 0.5 Zη )  
Total Surplus  Δ TS = P0abcP1 = Area Rectangle P0acd + Area 
Triangle abc 
Δ TS = Δ CS + Δ PS = P0 Q0 Z (1 + 0.5 Z η )  
For the case of the small open economy we know that Δ CS=0 as the reference is the world price and thus 
consumers do not benefit from the price reduction from the adoption of the innovation. Therefore 
producer surplus equals total surplus (Δ PS = Δ TS). The formula for producer surplus can be estimated 
by taking the limit of the formula for change in producer surplus when the demand elasticity approaches 
infinity (Alston, Norton and Pardey). Formula for producer surplus is therefore: 
(5)  Δ PS =  Δ TS = PW Q0 K (1 + 0.5 Zε )  
where Δ CS is the change in consumer surplus,   Δ PS is the change in producer surplus, Δ TS is 
the change in total surplus, due to the introduction of an innovation. The estimate of k, the cost reduction 
estimate induced by the introduction of biotechnology varieties, is crucial to the estimation of economic 
surplus and it is often the hardest variable to measure accurately. To improve the estimate of k, the 
researcher can use estimates of output changes due to the technology from experimental fields and/or  50 
 
 
actual results in the farmer fields. Yield increases can be transformed into cost-reduction by dividing the 
industry or experimental yield increase by the elasticity of supply (Alston, Norton and Pardey). The 
advantage of using experiment station information is that the researcher is able to isolate other sources of 
yield increase and/or cost decrease. Conversely, farm data can be used in conjunction with adoption 
information to get a better estimate of how the varieties performed in field situations. There has been a 
gap between experiment station yield information and on-farm performance showing as much as 50 
percent higher yield on experiment plots. 
Alternatively the analyst may use information from surveys of farmers, on-farm experiment plots, 
and on-station experiment plots to refine the estimate of k. The procedure may be applied at the national, 
regional and even local level by appropriately weighting the shares of each sub-group to the overall k. 
Yield changes need to be transformed to equivalent cost change units. The equivalent cost change of yield 
is found by dividing yield change by the elasticity of supply. For pesticide savings, input cost change per 
ton is found by dividing input cost change per acre by (1 + percent change in yield). For technology fees, 
input cost change per ton is found by dividing input cost change by (1 + percent change in yield). Net cost 
change is found by adding yield equivalent cost change, pesticide input cost change, and technology fee 
input cost change. Overall, K is found by multiplying the net cost change by the adoption rate. 
Limitations of the economic surplus approach  
Alston et al. (1995) and other authors have pinpointed the advantages and limitations of the economic 
surplus approach. The major advantages are that these methods are parsimonious with respect to data and 
can be used to portray the effects on the benefits distribution of various institutional and market 
structures. The principal disadvantages are: 
1.  The surplus calculated is Marshallian, which accounts for price effects but not for changes in the 
income of farmers.  
2.  The approach ignores transactions costs, assuming that markets clear and function well.   
3.  As with any partial equilibrium model, prices and quantities of other commodities produced by 
farmers are fixed. 
4.  Effects on input markets are not investigated. In particular, the approach does not account 
explicitly for returns to land or labor, which are critical factors for measuring the impact of new 
technologies on the national and regional economy.  
5.  Furthermore, farmers are considered to be risk-neutral, price-takers who either maximize profits 
or minimize costs.   51 
 
 
6.  As we have seen in the farm-level studies, year-specific effects on productivity can be large but 
are not accounted for in single-year, ex post studies. Location-specific effects on the farm budget 
data that provide parameters of the models can also be large. Year-specific and location-specific 
effects are especially pronounced for farming systems in developing countries where crop 
management practices and conditions are highly heterogeneous. 
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Note: Pw = World Price, S0 = quantity supply before innovation adoption, S1 = supply after innovation adoption, D = Demand, 
C0= Quantity consumed before innovation, Q0 = Quantity produced before innovation adoption, Q1 = Quantity produced after 
innovation adoption, QT0 = Quantity traded before innovation adoption, QT1= Quantity traded after innovation adoption. 
Economic Surplus Model for West Africa 
The following estimates were made for the countries Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal and Togo, each 
of which is represented with a subscript i in formulas below. The rest of the cotton producing countries in 
West Africa were grouped with other countries named Rest of the World (ROW).   
Global and National Adoption 
We assumed that each scenario would start in 2006. The adaptive R&D and biosafety regulatory 
assessment would last until 2011. Adoption starts in 2012 in Burkina Faso, followed by other adopting 
countries 3 years later, after their own assessments. The initial adoption phase was modeled using a 
logistic curve with a maximum adoption rate that varied according to country and scenario (See Table 
4a).   
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Estimation of K 
Estimation of the K value for each one of the countries in the study is as follows: 
  
Total Cost Change (ΔCi) = (Δ Yieldi / εi ) + {Δ Costi / (1 +  εi )] – {Ti / TCi) 
Potential Ki (Kpoti) = ΔCi * Ai 
Effective Ki (Keffi) = Kpoti * Ri 
Kfi= Kpoti * SiBt  
 
where Total Cost Change due to the innovation is ΔCi , Δ Yieldi is the yield difference between 
Bt cotton and conventional cotton , εi is the elasticity of supply in country i, Δ Costi is the cost difference 
between Bt cotton and conventional cotton in country i, , Ti is the technology fee, and TCi is the Total 
costs of production in country i.  Ai is the adoption rate in country i, Ri is the probability of R&D success 
(assumed in this exercise to be 100 percent), SiBt is the share of the hectares of Bt planted in country i with 
respect to total global area planted.  
The overall (global) K (Kw) is estimated by adding the individual countries in West Africa and 
the ROW.  
 
Kw = KfBenin + KfBurkina + KfMali + KfSenegal + KfTogo + KfROW 
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Estimation of prices and quantities  
The Kw is used to estimate the global market clearing price P1w with the technology adoption based on 
























The observed price is the global market clearing price P1w is weighted by the difference in global price 
with and without the technology so that in the end, all prices in individual countries have the absolute 
equivalent departure from the estimated world price.  
 
Weighted P1i (WP1i ) = P1i – (P1w – P0w)  
 
 
Formula for Zi  
 
Zi =  (P1i – P0i) / P0i 
Producer, Consumer and Innovator Surplus 
Formula for producer surplus estimated for each one of the countries in West Africa is as follows 
 
Δ PSi  =  Δ TSi = P0i Q0i (Ki – Zi ) (1 + 0.5 Zi εi ) 
 
Formula for Innovator Surplus: 
 
Δ PS = Tech feei * Area Planted *Ai 
 
Formula for Producer Surplus Rest of the World  
 
Δ PSROW  =  Δ TSi = P0i Q0i (Ki – Zi ) (1 + 0.5 Zi εi )  55 
 
 
APPENDIX C.  
Questions that need a more detailed answer for the assessment of the potential economic 
benefits in West Africa  
Status of cotton production 
1)  What are the major and minor (secondary) insect pests that attack cotton in West Africa? What 
are the dynamics of pest populations in West Africa? What are the levels of damage by 
Lepidopteran and other insects? 
2)  What are the levels of damage by other productivity constraints such as diseases, drought, 
management practices problems, etc.   
3)  What are actual and potential (feasible) cotton yields? 
4)  What are the most binding productivity constraints? 
5)  How many pesticide applications are farmers applying for target pests? For non-target pests?  
6)  Are there Integrate Crop and Pest Management (ICPM) practices being used in West Africa? 
How does Bt cotton fit within the scope of an ICPM managed system? 
7)  Need carefully collected data of partial and full budget for farm households that produce cotton in 
the region.  
Performance of the technology 
1)  Will Bt cotton reduce insecticide use and reduce damage due to Lepidopteran insects? 
2)  Will Bt cotton increase income to farmers? 
3)  Will there be a need to establish insect resistant management strategies (IRM) in West Africa? 
4)  Are IRM strategies feasible for implementation in West Africa? 
5)  Will Bt cotton reduce biodiversity in the region? Need information on wild relatives, sexual 
compatibility with relatives, pollen flow, rate of successful introgression into population, 
potential damage to wild relative populations and a full risk assessment of all these components.  
Institutional 
1)  Is there the necessary institutional framework to support the transfer of knowledge to farmers to 
empower them to manage the technology? 
2)   What will the technology diffusion pathway be like? Private or public sector led effort? 
3)  What is the technology fee that innovators will charge in West Africa?  
4)  Will there be a contractual agreement between the innovator and producers? What are the 
conditions by which farmers will get access to the technology? 
5)  Who will negotiate on behalf of farmers? Farmer associations and cooperatives?  
6)  Will companies share the benefits of the technology with farmers as in other parts of the world?  
7)  Will farmer associations and cooperative have the power to negotiate a technology fee that allows 
benefit sharing generated by the use of the technology? As demonstrated elsewhere, even in the 
presence of a monopolistic innovator, benefits may need to be shared with producers, particularly 
in the early stages of adoption, where other alternatives exist (conventional production with 
pesticides or other crops) and/or where there have been limits to the innovators’ ability to align 
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